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And No More Shall We Shout: Noise By-laws, Freedom of Expression and a 
Montréal Sex Club 
Richard Haigh
*
 (with Batya Nadler
**
) 
My partner and I recently attended a rock concert in Toronto. The band was Iceland’s 
hottest (!) new group. We were seated in the balcony at the very side, slightly behind the 
proscenium – not the most coveted seats, although they afforded an incredible view of the inner 
workings of the band. The seats were also less than 10 feet from the left-hand bank of nine 
loudspeakers suspended from the stage gantry – speakers whose purpose was to fill the concert 
hall with noise. I didn’t have a sound meter, but from our vantage point, during its peaks, the 
noise level must have been close to 120db.
i
That night, as we left the concert and walked through a normal Saturday night street 
scene in Toronto, a Harley Davidson motorbike accelerated past in a deafening roar. It was 
physically painful. From the sidewalk where we were standing, as the bike passed us (again, 
probably no more than 5 feet away at its closest point), my guess would be that the noise level 
coming out of the exhaust was close to 140db. The bike put Iceland’s rock stars to shame. 
Noise is a complex phenomenon. Like most of us living today, I believe that I am subject 
to a lot more noise than previous generations.
ii
 The urban soundscape is now filled with a
cacophony of different sounds: from leaf blowers to car alarms to the staccato sounds of car 
horns triggered by keyless ignition systems. At the same time, however, noise is a conditioning 
phenomenon: after frequent exposure, the brain becomes conditioned and stops treating noise as 
a warning signal. So, unlike our ancestors who relied on hearing to sense danger, we treat noise 
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as largely benign. This brain adaptation also means that most of us are not even aware of long-
term changes in noise levels; we can get used to chainsaws, automobile horns, construction 
equipment, car alarms, and the like. 
The complexity is also due to noise being very personal. That motorcycle offended me: 
not only did the noise hurt, but my post-concert reflective space felt violated. On the other hand, 
the Harley Davidson driver no doubt loves and cherishes the noise of his unmuffled V-Twin. 
Those who hate rock music might, at best, find a loud Icelandic rock group annoying, but 
possibly irritating or even downright painful. Is the big difference between the exhaust noise and 
the music a question of consent? I was prepared for an evening of rock music; I did not expect to 
have to endure the bleat of a Harley V-Twin at 5 feet. Moreover, do we fully consent to much of 
the noise around us? Is noise something that makes us truly human? And is the noise we create a 
form of self-fulfillment, linked to our freedom of expression? Subjectivity is crucial to 
understanding noise and its control. 
Governments have not allowed noise control to fall on deaf ears. The U.S. federal 
government, for example, far ahead of its time, enacted the Noise Control Act of 1972.
iii
 Other
countries have also enacted anti-noise by-laws.
iv
 Because noise is localized, some cities have
also responded. In 1994, the City of Montréal attempted to deal with troublesome noises by 
enacting a bylaw dealing with the control of noise in the metropolitan area.
v
 The By-law became
the subject of litigation. Eventually, the case, known as Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec 
Inc. (“Montréal”) vi  reached the Supreme Court of Canada. This short comment will, after
providing a brief case summary, focus almost entirely on the Court’s s. 2(b) analysis. It is left to 
others to comment on the approach to s. 1.  
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1. The Case
2952-1366 Quebec Inc. operated a club, Chateau du Sexe (the “Club”), located on a main 
thoroughfare in downtown Montréal. In order to attract customers and compete with a similar 
establishment on the same street, the Club installed speakers outside of the building, which 
broadcast a play-by-play of the goings on inside. On May 14, 1996 a police officer on patrol in 
downtown Montréal charged the Club under articles 9(1) and 11 of the By-law, which reads: 
9. In addition to the noise referred to in article 8, the following
noises, where they can be heard from outside are specifically 
prohibited: 
(1) Noise produced by sound equipment, whether it is inside a 
building or installed or used outside;… 
11. No noise specifically prohibited under articles 9 or 10 may be
produced, whether or not it affects an inhabited place.
The Club appeared before the Montréal Municipal Court. It argued that in enacting the provision 
the City had exceeded its delegated power to control nuisances and that the provisions 
constituted an unjustifiable infringement on its right to freedom of expression guaranteed under 
section s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
vii
 The Municipal Court ruled
that the City had not exceeded its jurisdiction and that the By-law did not restrict the guaranteed 
right.
viii
 The Club appealed. At the Superior Court, the conviction was overturned on the grounds
that the provision did in fact violate the right to freedom of expression as protected by the 
Charter.
ix
 That decision was upheld by a majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal.
x
 Fish J.A. (as
he then was), in his majority reasons, held that the City had not adequately established that the 
specific noise compromised peace and order and therefore unjustifiably violated a right to 
freedom of expression. Chamberland J.A., in dissent, argued that the provisions were in fact a 
reasonable and demonstrably justifiable limit on the right to freedom of expression as the City 
had no other way to eliminate noise pursuant to its legitimate authority to ensure peace and 
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public order and to regulate nuisances. The City appealed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded, in a 6-1 decision, that the By-law was a 
reasonable limitation on the right to freedom of expression. McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps J., 
writing for the majority, based their conclusion on a contextual reading of the concerned 
provision followed by a constitutional analysis in which they articulated a revised approach to 
freedom of expression in public spaces. In a stinging sole dissent, Binnie J. criticized the 
majority decision for its application of a method of contextual analysis generally reserved for 
crafting constitutional remedies and rarely, if ever, used for statutory interpretation. In his 
opinion the By-law was ultra vires the City as it infringed on freedom of expression and was not 
saved by s. 1. Even if it were to be held intra vires Binnie J. found that it would constitute an 
unreasonable exercise of the City’s delegated legislative power. 
Both judgments agree that in order to properly ascertain what the legislation is attempting 
to protect against, the court must engage in a process of contextual interpretation. This will be 
based not only on an analysis of the specific wording of the clause but also on the broader 
context. While both the majority and dissent agreed that the prohibition in article 9(1) infringed 
on the guarantee of freedom of expression, they parted company on the application of the 
contextual analysis and the Oakes
xi
 test for reasonable limits on guaranteed rights under s. 1 of
the Charter.
xii
(a) The Jurisdictional Issue 
The first step for the majority was to determine the purpose of the By-law. A brief review 
of the history of anti-noise legislation in Quebec initiated the discussion.
xiii
 This revealed that
previous laws were enacted to combat noise in order to “preserve the peaceful nature of public 
5 
spaces.”xiv The notion of “disruption” was found to be the common theme contained within the
entire By-law. Reading this theme into article 9(1), the majority held that the provision contained 
an implicit recognition that any disruptive noise that negatively influences enjoyment of the 
environment can be restricted. The majority concluded that the provision was focused on noise 
emanating from the specified sources – in this case the loudspeakers – and this could be 
differentiated from environmental noise. This purposive and contextualized approach resolved, 
for the majority, the explicit ambiguity of article 9(1). In intention and scope, it fell within the 
City’s delegated authority to regulate and define nuisances. 
Justice Binnie, in contrast, argued that the impugned article was not ambiguous at all. He 
highlighted three general categories of anti-noise legislation: (i) prohibition of noise exceeding 
objective measurable limits; (ii) prohibition by subjective criteria; and (iii) prohibition by source. 
In his view the majority had converted article 9(1) from a category (iii) prohibition into category 
(ii) by reading too much into the By-law. The City’s intention, as exemplified in the strict 
wording of the By-law (and as argued by counsel to the City) was to regulate noises by source (a 
category (iii) prohibition).
xv
 To Binnie J. it was evident that, based on a grammatical reading of
the provision, the lawmakers intended to impose a general ban on all noise whether a nuisance or 
not. The lack of precision in article 9(1), compared to other provisions, was a blatant decision to 
create an unambiguous but sweeping and all-encompassing clause.
xvi
 By adding the words “in
addition” at the beginning of article 9, the lawmakers were attempting to chart a new direction 
for the fight against noise pollution – imposing a source-based ban without assessing the quality 
or impact of the noise emanating from that source. The broad language of article 9(1) led him to 
conclude that it was ultra vires the City as “noise” in itself is not a nuisance. The City’s right to 
define and/or prohibit nuisances was not unlimited and generally requires noise by-laws to have 
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expressly specified, quantitative or qualitative, limits.  
(b) The Constitutional Issue 
Both the majority and dissent agreed that article 9(1) infringed s. 2(b) (Binnie J. simply 
agreeing with the majority on this point).
xvii
 The majority began its constitutional analysis by
applying the test for freedom of expression set out in Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General).
xviii
This requires examining whether: (i) noise has expressive content; (ii) the method or location of 
that expression excluded it from protection; and (iii) the By-law infringes on that protection in 
either purpose or effect. They concluded that, regardless of its message, the noise had expressive 
content as expressive activity is not precluded from protection simply by virtue of its message.
xix
For the second part of the test the Court scrutinized the place where the noise was 
emitted. At issue was the scope and extent of the street as public space. The majority then set out 
a series of guidelines to assist in determining the type of public space that attracted s. 2(b) 
protection. For them, in determining whether restricting expression would undermine the values 
of democratic discourse, truth finding, and self-fulfillment, history and actual function of a place 
must be considered.
xx
 The historical use of a place provides an indication as to whether
protecting expression in that venue has, in the past, supported the core values. Assessing the 
actual function of a place would highlight if, while being public in nature, it is essentially a 
private place. If so, the right to free expression should be attenuated. At the core of this analysis 
is the question of whether free expression in any place would undermine the values the guarantee 
is intended to advance.
xxi
 The Court’s intention in expanding on this point was to “provide a
preliminary screening process” that would limit to a certain degree the broad protection enabled 
by the courts within a s. 2(b) analysis.
xxii
 Applying the analysis to the facts, the majority held that
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a busy Montréal street did not exclude the noise from s. 2(b) protection.
xxiii
  
Finally, the Court found that the ban on the specified noise infringed freedom of 
expression by restricting expression that promoted the values of self-fulfilment and human 
flourishing, both of which are well-known purposes underlying the free expression guarantee.
xxiv
  
Disagreement arose, however, over whether article 9(1) could be saved as a reasonable 
and demonstrably justifiable limit prescribed by law under s. 1 of the Charter.  The majority 
argued that the City’s objective, namely the fight against noise pollution, was both pressing and 
substantial. In the two-pronged proportionality test from R. v. Oakes,
xxv
 they found that the limit 
on noise emanating from sound equipment was rationally connected to the objective. Noise 
pollution can be limited by a city in order to maintain the quality of public space. The measure 
was also found to impair the guaranteed freedom in a reasonably minimal way. A number of 
reasons were given. First, the majority was hesitant to interfere with elected officials’ discretion 
in dealing with what was deemed to be a serious social issue. Secondly, regulating degrees of 
loudness, a solution presented as an alternative to the impugned legislation, would not 
adequately balance the need to allow businesses to maximize commercial expression with the 
public's desire for peaceful streets. This was bolstered by the City’s submissions that there were 
no other practical ways to deal with the problem. Finally, the City, in a (strange) submission, 
argued that any over-inclusiveness in the By-law could be corrected by the judicious use of 
prosecutorial discretion.  
Binnie J. accepted neither the proposition that there were any limits in the relevant 
provision that were properly “prescribed by law”, nor that article 9(1) was a “[proportionate] 
response to the legitimate problem of noise pollution.”xxvi A provision should be either of no 
force and effect (hence unconstutional) or it should justifiably limit a right (constitutional) – it 
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could not be made effective with a warning to prosecutors to exercise discretion in the 
application of the impugned provision. The City’s argument, according to Binnie J., was 
dangerous.   
In addition, Binnie J. took issue with the majority’s contention that the Club could 
advertise its business through other means in order to avoid contravening the By-law. He argued 
that Montréalers have a right to freedom of expression which includes the right to utilize their 
own preferred mode of communication. They are entitled to challenge a law that limited their 
preference of communication especially if that law infringed on their rights to a degree that was 
entirely disproportionate to the City's objective.
xxvii
  
Although stirring, in the end Binnie J.’s judgment was a lone, and futile, shout. The 
majority allowed the By-law to stand.  
The decision is the first Canadian case of which we are aware that deals with the 
constitutionality of anti-noise by-laws. Although both the majority and dissent do devote some 
time to an overview of urban noise regulation in Quebec, there is, in my view, a conspicuous 
omission of science in the decision. A proper understanding of the science of noise and its 
control is fundamental to analysing how sound might legitimately affect freedom of expression. 
The next section is a brief attempt to redress that.  
 
2.  A Short Primer On Noise and Noise Pollution
xxviii
 
 
As mentioned, noise is a very complex phenomenon. In part, this is due to the difficulty 
of measuring it. Noise is usually measured in decibels (dB) on a scale from zero to 120 dB 
(theoretically, there is no upper limit; practically it is around 140 dB). The scale begins at zero, 
which was set to correspond roughly to the least powerful sound wave a very sensitive ear can 
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hear, set at a pressure of 2/10,000 of a microbar. The human ear is able, however, to perceive a 
huge range of sounds beyond that level. As a result, the decibel scale is logarithmic, so as to 
accommodate the complete range of over a million different audible sound pressures, from 
2/10,000 to 200 microbars (one million discrete steps). A 20 dB increase on the scale is therefore 
equivalent to a ten-fold noise level increase. Ambient room noise is usually between 50-60 dB on 
the A scale (see below); aural discomfort occurs at about 120 dBA and the threshold of pain is 
generally accepted as 140 dBA.  
The complexity of measurement is accentuated by the fact that there are a number of 
different decibel scales. The standard form of measurement is the decibel “A” scale, or dBA. The 
A scale tries to replicate the way the human ear hears – less sensitive to very low frequencies and 
very high frequencies. It does this by weighting high and low frequencies differently in a precise 
manner. Other scales include the B scale, the Perceived Noise Level scale, the Effective 
Perceived Noise Level scale, the Noise Criterion Level scale, and the Speech Interference Level 
scale. All of the different scales attempt to combat specific problems that invariably occur in 
quantifying sounds. Each is something of a compromise. To be precise, therefore, proper noise 
level measurements must indicate the scale that is used.   
Not only is it important to specify the scale, it is almost meaningless to identify specific 
levels of sound without stating the distance from the source of the noise. Because sound can be 
directional and ambient, it can fill an entire room or project directionally from a specific source, 
because it can occur in short bursts or continuously, and it may dissipate differently depending 
on direction and the medium it is traveling through, there is no point in trying to understand 
noise levels without relating them to the location of a sound meter. Normally, sound pressure 
levels drop off about six decibels for every doubling of distance. As an example, an electric 
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shaver can register 75 dBA at 2 feet; at 20 feet, the same razor sound is only 55 dBA, which is 
about 25% of the original loudness level.  Distance, therefore, can have significant effects on 
perceived loudness.  
Finally, there are the subjective elements of sound, mentioned earlier. To a listener's ears, 
the same sound can vary depending on his or her location relative to the sound source. Under 
identical conditions on a different day, the listener can perceive a completely different sound 
level. And since noise control can also occur without actual noise reduction – by changing the 
design parameters of buildings, road and subway rights-of-way, for example – the policy choices 
expand considerably. There is thus a large human element at play. 
All this means that noise control is an incredibly complex mix of science and art. When it 
intersects with freedom of expression, the problems of analysis multiply. It is no wonder that 
both legislatures and courts have a difficult time with it. The Supreme Court is to be commended 
for trying, but it is unfortunate that it did not have the benefit of more scientific information on 
noise (or, if it did, it is regrettable that it did not refer to it at all in its judgment).
xxix
   
 
 
3.  Did the Court Get it Right? 
 
Ever since the beginning of s. 2(b) jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Canada has been 
careful not to stake out much judicial territory in regards to the Charter’s commandments of 
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression.
xxx
 The analytical framework for a s. 2(b) 
analysis, carved out by Dickson C.J. in Irwin Toy, has remained virtually intact. The test, as it 
has stood for almost 20 years now, is to establish whether the activity is expressive; if it is, then 
to assess whether the expressive activity takes an unprotected form in which case there is no 
breach of s. 2(b) (violence being a common example of an unprotected form). If the form is 
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protected, then the question is whether the governmental response infringes upon expression in 
purpose or in effect. If the purpose is infringing, the analysis shifts immediately to s. 1; if the 
effect is to infringe, then the three rationales of free expression – as an instrument for democratic 
government, an aid to the search for truth and the marketplace of ideas, and a tool for individual 
self-fulfillment and autonomy – must be engaged or else the legislative provision or equivalent is 
deemed not to offend s. 2(b). The test seems relatively complex, but since the Court has defined 
expressive activities to encompass almost any form of human endeavour (an activity is 
“expressive if it attempts to convey meaning” xxxi ) virtually all of the work in freedom of 
expression cases occurs at the s. 1 stage.  
Arguably, this broad interpretation of s. 2(b) has not been overly problematic. The 
biggest challenge the Court has faced so far has been determining the scope of expression in the 
areas of hate literature, pornography and commercial speech. All of these involve some form of 
direct, natural or unadorned human activity (however distasteful): in speech or song – the natural 
human voice; in painting or drawing – the artistry of the human hand; in commercial advertising 
– the wit, wisdom and saleability of human-invented signs and typefaces. There has been little 
conceptual difficulty in determining these to be expressive forms of activity. 
What about expression that is less directly “human-centred,” or that requires technology 
to produce? Where the medium and the message are both connected and distinct? As was noted, 
article 9(1) of the By-law in Montréal was just such a provision. The starting point, for these 
situations, is the Court’s decision in Ford v. Québec (AG). xxxii  In it, the court rejected a 
distinction between a message and its medium, at least for language. As the Court noted: 
Language is so intimately related to the form and content of expression that there 
cannot be true freedom of expression by means of language if one is prohibited 
from using the language of one’s choice. Language is not merely a means or 
medium of expression; it colours the content and meaning of expression. …That 
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the concept of “expression” in s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter …goes beyond 
mere content is indicated by the specific protection accorded to “freedom of 
thought, belief [and] opinion” in s. 2. …That suggests that “freedom of 
expression” is intended to extend to more than the content of expression in its 
narrow sense. …It has already been indicated why that distinction is inappropriate 
as applied to language as a means of expression because of the intimate 
relationship between language and meaning.
xxxiii
 
 
Then, in Irwin Toy, the Court seemed to take a slightly different tack, recognizing that shouting 
may be a form of communication severable from content:  
“Expression” has both a content and a form, and the two can be inextricably 
connected. …In showing that the effect of the government’s action was to restrict 
her free expression, a plaintiff must demonstrate that her activity promotes at least 
one of these principles. It is not enough that shouting, for example, has an 
expressive element. If the plaintiff challenges the effect of government action to 
control noise, presuming that action to have a purpose neutral as to expression, 
she must show that her aim was to convey a meaning reflective of the principles 
underlying freedom of expression. …how it relates to the pursuit of truth, 
participation in the community, or individual self-fulfillment and human 
flourishing.
xxxiv
  
 
Finally, in Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada
xxxv
 Lamer J. added the 
criterium of location – where the expression occurs can affect the analysis of whether freedom of 
expression is breached: 
The fact that one’s freedom of expression is intrinsically limited by the function 
of a public place is an application of the general rule that one’s rights are always 
circumscribed by the rights of others. … In my view, if the expression takes a 
form that contravenes or is inconsistent with the function of the place where the 
attempt to communicate is made, such a form of expression must be considered to 
fall outside the sphere of s. 2(b).
xxxvi
 
 
But since these cases, the Court has not addressed the issue further (or, it has not really had the 
opportunity to do so) as none of the intervening cases have been concerned with the medium of 
communication. Montréal, however, was such a case. It provided the Court with an opportunity 
to revisit its analytical approach to s. 2(b), at least as it relates to specific places and forms of 
communication. That opportunity was only half taken.  
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(a) The Good News: A Renewed Appreciation of Context 
The majority in Montréal continued the Court’s tradition of treating s. 2(b) broadly, but 
they did add something new – a rejuvenated understanding of the relevance of the manner and 
place of communication in an analysis of expression. The discussion centred on appropriate uses 
of public spaces while the method of communication was unfortunately given short shrift (as will 
be discussed). The Court refined its approach from Commonwealth: 
Expressive activity should be excluded from the protective scope of s. 2(b) only if 
its method or location clearly undermines the values that underlie the 
guarantee.  … [I]n determining what public spaces fall outside s. 2(b) protection, 
we must ask whether free expression in a given place undermines the values 
underlying s. 2(b)…. 
 
The basic question with respect to expression on government-owned property 
is whether the place is a public place where one would expect constitutional 
protection for free expression on the basis that expression in that place does not 
conflict with the purposes which s. 2(b) is intended to serve, namely (1) 
democratic discourse, (2) truth finding and (3) self-fulfillment. To answer this 
question, the following factors should be considered: (a) the historical or actual 
function of the place; and (b) whether other aspects of the place suggest that 
expression within it would undermine the values underlying free expression. 
xxxvii
 
 
This is a new, and in some aspects, welcome approach. For one, the test is expressly broadened 
to include the method of communication as well as location. As the majority notes, “the evidence 
does not establish that the method and location at issue here…impede the function of city 
streets.”xxxviii Secondly, the majority takes the view that expressive activity in public spaces can 
be prohibited without offending s. 2(b). Later on they comment that “[the test] reflects the reality 
that some places must remain outside the protected sphere of s. 2(b). People must know where 
they can and cannot express themselves and government should not be required to justify every 
exclusion or regulation of expression under s. 1.”xxxix In other words, there may be occasions 
where it is not necessary to resort to s. 1 in order to save regulations restricting expression. The 
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long-standing view that most, if not all, the heavy lifting in freedom of expression analysis is 
done at the s. 1 stage has been firmly modified. Any lingering doubts about the importance of 
context in expression cases, left over from the lack of unanimity in Commonwealth, have been 
laid to rest.  
 
(b) The Not-So-Good news: More Factors and a Missed Opportunity 
Two aspects of the decision remain a disappointment. The first is a now almost mundane 
complaint about the growing use of “factor” analysis in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. 
For example, there has been no lack of criticism to s. 15 after the Law test and its dignity factor 
analysis.
xl
 It relies heavily on trying to weigh and balance different, and sometimes 
contradictory, factors. There is now a similar requirement for s. 2(b) where location is in issue: 
the need to review a place’s historical and actual function, and whether “other aspects of [a] 
place”xli might engage freedom of expression values. The difficulty with any factor analysis is 
assessing how to weigh each one. The Court seems to understand and prepare itself for this 
eventuality, noting that “some imprecision is inevitable”.xlii But is this good enough? How does 
one go about assessing the historical and actual function of a place? To take just two examples 
arising from the case itself: what if the historical and actual functions of a place are diametrically 
opposed? Should governments be able to regulate this form of expression because the 
"government function require[s] privacy" or not regulate because there is a historical precedent 
of free expression?
xliii
 Or, as a second example, is rude behaviour now controllable in a 
courtroom or legislative houses, because it amounts to “other aspects of a place” not subject to 
constitutional protection? Without additional guidance as to how these factors are to work, lower 
courts will more than likely end up with decisions that are all over the map, requiring further 
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Supreme Court intervention to clarify. It is an inherent problem in any form of factor analysis 
that judicial discretion and subjectivity tend to predominate over principled analysis. 
The second, and more fundamental problem is a growing unease I have with the lack of 
sophistication in the basic s. 2(b) analysis. It is no doubt true that expression should be protected 
and governments should have to justify encroachments on it. It is also correct, in my view, to 
continue to respect the three underlying values related to the purpose of freedom of expression. 
However, it may be time to take a fresh look at whether other principles should inform the idea 
of expression, and whether manner and form of expression (or, to use the language of the Court, 
the “method or location”) are, in some situations, distinguishable from expression itself. 
Montréal provided a perfect opportunity to engage in this debate on the specific issue of 
amplification. That opportunity was squandered. 
Noise, as has been shown, is sometimes only peripherally connected with expression. If 
there is any “expression”, it is often not direct human expression. In the case of a rock concert or 
a club promoting its operations remotely through a loudspeaker, the expression begins as a 
human voice, but the soundwave is then electronically processed and reconstructed as amplified 
sound. In the case of a Harley Davidson motorcycle, the “expression” comes from the workings 
of an internal combustion engine.
xliv
 
The initial reason for conjoining form and content in Ford was in the context of a 
language dispute. As the Court in that case noted, any distinction between form and content is 
“inappropriate as applied to language as a means of expression.” xlv  That argument holds 
considerable weight. No one would want freedom of expression to exist in one language but not 
in another. But there have been few reminders in subsequent cases of the need to keep the two 
together. The passage from Ford, above, has not been repeated since.
xlvi
 In Irwin Toy the Court 
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mentions the “inextricable connection” between form and content but then proceeds to 
acknowledge that the two can be disconnected.
xlvii
 On a very limited number of occasions, 
therefore, has the Court admonished against artificially separating the medium and message. In 
other words, the distinction, specifically announced in Ford in the context of language, has not 
been applied in other areas, and has certainly not been part of a broader debate on expression in 
sound amplification.  
Amplification changes expression simply by its nature as a “medium”. It is not equivalent 
to earlier concerns, since dismissed, as to whether commercial labeling,
xlviii
 advertising,
xlix
 or 
banning advertisements directed at children,
l
 are expressive. Neither should it be thought of as 
simply accentuating what a person standing on a soapbox should be entitled to say. Amplified 
sound is much more. It is equivalent to asking whether the same man-on-a-soapbox rules 
regarding expressive content should apply to Superman standing on a tower of mega-size 
detergent boxes. It is only peripherally an issue about freedom of expression; more likely, it is a 
question of freedom to expand expression beyond normal human agency. In any event, there is 
no doubt that it is something requiring a full discussion in the context of a s. 2(b) analysis. It 
goes to the heart of what is “expression,” deserving of much more than the Court’s conclusion 
that “[i]t is clear that noise emitted by loudspeakers from building onto the street can have 
expressive content.”li There is a larger question at stake when one is considering whether a city 
could suppress a noise like the 140dBA Harley, but leave famous rock groups alone. It will now 
have to wait for another suitable case.
lii
 
Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, part of the analysis of noise, as a form of 
expression, requires a consideration of consent. One would think that consent should form part of 
any discussion involving context. Acoustical engineers define noise as “any unwanted sound”liii 
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What could be more contextual than that! If a person does not like a sound, therefore, the 
scientific literature considers that to be noise. In any event, the Court did not consider whether 
anti-noise by-laws need to be more tailored for purposes of s. 2(b). Loud advertising might be 
supportable in a late night, sex club area like St. Catherine’s street but not in the leafy district of 
Outremont.  
There may be another chance soon – although given the Court’s trepidation to stray 
outside the basic facts of a case, this may be overly optimistic. A case from the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, Vann Niagara Ltd. v. Oakville (Town of)
liv
 has been given leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The case concerns a municipal sign bylaw prohibiting billboard signs within the 
town’s borders. Again, the issue is whether the by-law infringes expression. It is another case 
where the medium and the message are not necessarily connected. Like amplification, is it 
possible to imagine that at some point, the size of a sign (like the volume of sound) becomes 
more important than the message contained therein? We live in a world where extravagant 
excess is fashionable: Super-size meals, booming car stereos played with the windows down 
(whose main purpose, therefore is to promote the owner’s prowess, not to listen to music), and 
now billboards that use full-scale school buses or multi-storey video images (again, not so much 
as to promote a product as to promote the size and scale of the manufacturer). If Marshall 
McLuhan knew, in 1964, what his legacy would produce, he may well have thought that because 
the medium is the message, the medium will become louder or larger at the expense of the 
message. It is hoped that the Court realizes the need to engage in some of these ideas about the 
nature of expression itself, rather than rely almost exclusively on the straitjacket of s. 1. 
 
Conclusion   
 
People are annoyed, distracted and probably kept awake at night because of noise. Cities 
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would be more pleasant places to live if there was less noise. For a very large part of the 
population, noise is the most serious of pollutants. The consequences may not be as serious as an 
outbreak of e. coli in the water supply, but the impacts of excessive noise are more immediate on 
more people. Noise causes annoyance, and for many people, can have a serious and detrimental 
effect on sleep. It is an effect that is more immediate and identifiable than breathing polluted air, 
having contaminated streams or lakes or living shorter lives because of low-level contaminated 
foodstuffs.  
At the same time, cities are now international competitors in the world economy. Events 
such as the Olympics and large-scale theatre spectacles, or destination architecture, are sought 
after by cities in open competition. High-level bargaining and diplomacy are required for this 
task, so that cities now have dedicated departments of commerce, tourism and trade working full 
time on the politics and pursuit of these “mega” events. The billions of dollars generated, 
controlled and/or distributed by organizations like the International Olympic Committee gives it 
the global clout to interfere, not just with State governments, but city ordinances and bylaws. It 
seems reasonable to expect that a city may decide to control noise as a result of some of these 
possible external factors.
lv
 In the end, the Supreme Court in Montréal did allow the By-law to 
stand because of s. 1 of the Charter. I believe the conclusion is good – it is only the lack of a 
deeper analysis of s. 2(b) that disappoints.  
Cities themselves have an increasingly large impact upon national identity, as well as 
being a popular forum for its expression. Although early concerns about globalisation focused on 
the loss of the independent nation-state versus the global Leviathan, this has been proven to be 
overly simplistic.
lvi
 The new globalization model sees economic power shifting in both 
directions: to the global and local levels simultaneously. As Thomas Courchene coins it, the new 
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process is one of “glocalization”, noting that nation states are now “too large to tackle the small 
things in life and too small to address the large things”.lvii Cities are thus required to develop 
local statehood, so as to engage in international competition with other cities, while also 
expanding capacity to deliver local services, some of which are targeted at attracting foreign 
tourism and investment. Creating the climate for this occurs in many ways, one of which is to 
design and implement policies that distinguish one city from another. The city “branding” 
becomes crucial to this success. Cities are slowly transforming into commodities.  
The City, therefore, becomes an expression in itself. Seen in this way, a quiet city is, 
conceptually, little different from an amplified noise. In a sense, neither are what should pass for 
“expression” or “expressive activity”. Both are symbols. But if one is a collective of like-minded 
people wanting quiet, and the other is a technological process involving electrons, which is really 
the more human? 
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